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List of All Parties
All parties to this appeal appear in the caption of this brief. Cline lists
several other individuals in the captions of his notice of appeal and opening
brief. Although those individuals were named in the amended complaint, they
had not been served when the district court entered its order of dismissal and
were therefore never made parties to the proceeding below. See Otteson v.
Dep't of Human Servs., 945 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
"[flailure to dismiss additional named defendants who had not been served at
the time of the entry of the . . . order of dismissal did not leave claims pending
in the district court" and did not "prevent the entry of final judgment since
the unserved defendants were not made parties to the action prior to
dismissal").
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No. 20061050-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EARL L. CLINE, II,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JUDITH ANN FORSYTHE AKA CHRIS FORSYTHE AS AN INDIVIDUAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

Brief of Appellee

Statement of Jurisdiction
This matter comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah
Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) because this
is an appeal from a judgment of a court of record over which this Court does
not have original appellate jurisdiction. On November 16, 2006, the matter
was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). R. 527-28.
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Issues Presented
1.

Fraud claim
One of the essential elements of a fraud claim is reliance on a false

statement. Cline alleged that he disagreed with Forsythe's statements and
even tried to repudiate them. Did the district court correctly conclude that
Cline's fraud claim failed because Cline never believed Forsythe's statements?

A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness,
affording no deference to the district court. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was raised in Forsythe's motion to dismiss and supporting
memorandum. R. 313-17. The district court decided this issue in its order
granting the motion to dismiss. R. 490-92.

-2-

2.

Rule 11 sanctions
Cline asserted civil rights claims against Forsythe that had been

dismissed previously, twice with prejudice in state court and once on
jurisdictional grounds in federal court. Because this was the fourth time Cline
asserted those identical claims against Forsyth, the district court sanctioned
Cline by imposing filing restrictions and assessing attorney fees for the time
spent defending the claims. Did the district court correctly determine a Rule
11 violation occurred and was the sanction appropriate?

A. Standard of Review
'"Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a
question of law." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 1989). "If
a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated, and we
will affirm the particular sanction imposed by the trial court, including the
reasonableness of any fee award, absent an abuse of discretion." Id.

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was raised in Forsythe's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and
accompanying memoranda. R. 420-24, 443-45. The district court decided this
issue in its order imposing Rule 11 sanctions. R. 474-81.
-3-

3.

RICO claim
A claim brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act ("RICO") must allege a pattern of racketeering activity and
be pled with sufficient specificity to establish probable cause of the alleged
predicate criminal acts. Cline's complaint did neither. Did the district court
correctly dismiss the claim?
Cline did not raise his RICO claim in his prior lawsuits against
Forsythe. Those lawsuits all arose out of the same core set of facts as this
case. Does the doctrine of claim preclusion provide an alternative basis for the
dismissal of the RICO claim because he could have brought the claim in the
prior lawsuits?

A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness,
affording no deference to the district court. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,196 (Utah 1991).
B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was raised in Forsythe's motion to dismiss and supporting
memorandum. R. 310-13. The district court decided this issue in its order
granting the motion to dismiss. R. 490.
-4-

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are atta

'denda:

Utah M l -A 1" l in i

Statement of the Case
•.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the disinri nMII l/a final nulvr granting

Forsythe's motio

irder imposing Rule 11 sanctions.

CIii ii," sued a ,sl al.e child protection case worker seeking damages for fraud and
a RICO violation allegedly committed by the case worker while she \\ a
conducting a child abuse investigation.

2.

•

the Proceedings Below

In 2004, plaintiff Earl Cline, II, sued the Division of Child and Family
Services and a Division employee, Chris Forsyte
included several civil rights claims and sir
After the district

.

A
R. 4, 6, % J, ~~~

of the claims with prejudice, Cline

-5-

appealed. R. 171-82, 206. In Cline v. State, 2005 UT App 498,142 P.3d 127,
this Court affirmed the dismissal of all claims but one - a personal capacity
fraud claim against Forsythe arising only out of her second investigation. Id.
at f 42.
On remand, Forsythe filed a motion to dismiss based on Cline's failure
to plead the elements of fraud with particularity, an issue not raised
previously and not considered by this Court in the first appeal. R. 243-56.
Cline then filed an amended complaint. R. 282-96. The amended
complaint named additional defendants who were never served. R. 282-84.
The amended complaint asserted a fraud claim and a RICO claim against
Forsythe. R. 285-91, 293-94. It also alleged civil rights claims against
Forsythe under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. R. 291-93.
Forsythe filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and a
supporting memorandum. R. 301-408. Forsythe also filed a motion for Rule 11
sanctions against Cline, with supporting memoranda. R. 416-25, 442-46.
The district court granted Forsythe's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. R. 483-94. The district court also granted the motion for sanctions,
awarding Forsythe attorney fees in the amount of $7,083.25 and imposing
filing restrictions on Cline. R. 474-81. The restrictions barred Cline from
filing "any new actions arising out of the same core set of facts without the
-6-

advance express permission of the L
Cline then timely ... >

520-21.

Disposition Below
The district court entered an order on October 11, 2006, granting
Forsythe's motion for Rule : i sanctions. J< 4i 1 e i I'IH disi.nn ruurl entered
an order on October I

t»ra 111111n Forsythe's motion to dismiss.

K. 4K:J4)4.

Statement of Facts

1.

Repeated filings
lite amende,I iom|plmhl „il »s i ie here is Cline's fourth attempt to raise

identical or similar claims against Forsythe out of the same core set of facts.
Those four attempts included: (1) the initial complaint in this case;

i

federal lawsuit; (3) a second state court lav .ml, OK I i ) • I li*« inclusion of
previously adjudic

nded complaint in this case.

^ t h o u g h the orders were filed on different days, it appears that the
court granted the orders contemporaneously, since they were both signed on
October 10, 2006. R. 481, 493.
-7-

A. Original complaint in this action
The initial complaint in the present case was filed in 2004. The factual
allegations centered around Cline's state court custody proceedings - the
protective order and divorce cases - and Forsythe's involvement in
investigating allegations of child abuse raised in those proceedings. R. 3-5.
Cline's complaint included multiple tort claims, including fraud, and several
civil rights claims, including claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983, and 1985.
R. 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10. The complaint was dismissed in its entirety with
prejudice and Cline appealed. R. 171-82

B. Lawsuit in federal court
A month after the dismissal of his state court lawsuit, and while the
dismissal of that case was on appeal, Cline sued Forsythe in federal court.
R. 320-45. The factual allegations of that complaint also centered around
Cline's state court protective order and divorce proceedings, as well as
Forsythe's and other case workers' investigation into abuse allegations.
R. 322, 324-25, 328-32. Among other claims, Cline raised a civil rights
conspiracy claim and a fraud claim. R. 325, 326, 340. The federal district
court dismissed Cline's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, based on the Rooker-

-8-

Feldman and Younger abstention dm'I niies„l

C. Secor . .
T\VPIVP

lawsuit

days after the.dismissal of his federal lawsuit, Cline sued

Korsythe again in state court. R. 355-85. Because Third J udicial I hsl rn'i
Judge Robert K. Hilder was named as a part:

>

Fourth Judicial District. The .>
centered arou

sferred to the
i lie complaint in that case

* :ourt protective order and divorce proceedings

,,ii(| | .i|'NV<f]pTs investigation of child abuse allegations. R. 3gi_62, JjliiHiiS.
That complaint included multiple tort claims, including

\ sever?11

civil rights claims, including claims undei 41J. I' . • i\ -V, i!f,s 1, 1983, and 1985.
R. 362, T/8. While ;, im}\

vm

\A} th.smiss was pending, this Court issued its

deci s i < \ i HI 11 w • «; \ | > i >oal of the first state court lawsuit, affirming the trial
court's "dismissal with prejudice of all claims agains
exception of Cline's claim against Forsythl<

^

Forsyii

v i 1,11 I In

u *acity for

•fraud arising only out ot hvs si\m• • I invost *^ < «i> "}See Cline v. State, 2005
I IT A(*|) Jtlfi-\ i '|| V\ Tlii» district court subsequently dismissed all of the
claims in the second state court lawsuit, except for the fraud claim,

2

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist o/ i \)lnmhiu
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
-9-

dismissed without prejudice. R. 388. Cline appealed the dismissal, but this
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Cline v. State (Cline
II), 2007 UTApp 111.

D. Amended complaint in first state court lawsuit
On remand of Cline's fraud claim, Cline filed an amended complaint.
The factual allegations of the amended complaint again centered around
Cline's state court protective order and divorce proceedings and Forsythe's
investigation of child abuse allegations, both the initial investigation and the
second investigation after Forsythe re-opened the case. R. 284-91. Cline's
amended complaint included a fraud claim and a RICO claim against
Forsythe. R. 285-91, 293-94. The amended complaint also included civil rights
claims against Forsythe under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983, and 1985. R. 291-93.

2.

The allegations in the amended complaint
In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts

as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint. Thus, this
statement of facts is based on Cline's amended complaint. Furthermore, only
the facts material to the second investigation are material to the fraud claim
because this Court remanded the fraud claim only as it relates to the re-10-

opened investigation. Other facts atv smnmarr/ed helnw only as background
to the second investigati
irte protective order was issued that ordered the
Division of Child and Family Services to investigate allegations tix
had abused his son. R. 284. Forsythe was assigned

>
onducted

an investigation, which included inl.ei viewing < iline's son and other children.
I* Vj'm ' l h e p r o i e d e . imhi was eventually dismissed. R. 286.
I * H-s

then received additional information which led her to begin a

second investigation. In this second investigation, Forsyth re interview -ed
several of Cline's children.

children

disclosed in the new inten i e w :•; 111: \ I 111. * v 11 a 11 been bruised in spankings '•
a(jm|nj

298. Forsythe's statements regarding disclosures

were allegedly false. R. 298. Based on those new disclosures, Forsyth
substantiated Cline for physical abuse on the Division * d n M • 11 • u;-1 •* latabase.
R. 298. Forsythe allegedly fabricated I In diseln, ir<« - io help Cline's wife win
custod -I! (.In « liiiilni'.,,, I1, '",' 'i,
Cline sought to repudiate Forsythe's statements in a juvenile court
proceeding to reverse Forsythe's database substantiation. K ',:!Hti K! i 11 e ; 11 s< >
alleged that the "children never tola

*

that the children were, J11 I 111 in

.- bruised" and
by him. R. 288-89.

-n-

In his notice of claim, which was attached to the original complaint in
this case, Cline also made several additional allegations regarding his
reaction to Forsythe's statements. R. 14-21. Cline stated that he twice
confirmed with two of the children that they had not disclosed abuse to
Forsythe. R. 16-17. Cline also confronted Forsythe about her decision to
substantiate the abuse when he "got angry" at Forsythe and asked, "[H]ow
can you substantiate that I bruised [my son] when you haven't even spoken
with him yet[?]" R. 17. Further, Cline spoke to Forsythe's supervisor and
asked for a different case worker to be sent to re-investigate because "there
was strong evidence to suggest that [Forsythe] was lying about what the
children told her." R. 18.
Despite his disagreement with Forsythe's statements and efforts to
repudiate them, Cline alleged that he made several concessions in his custody
battle because of the statements. R. 286. He stipulated at_a protective order
hearing to dismiss a protective order petition he had filed against his wife
and he later stipulated in the divorce case that his wife could have temporary
custody of the children. R. 286.

-12-

Summary of the Argument
The district court correctly dismissed ('line's fraud claim because Cline
failed to plead that he had relied on Korsythe's statements in ignorance of
their falsity. W\v N 1111i ir>, »»wn allegations established that he questioned
Uir i n thfulness of Forsythe's statements and sought to repudiate thorn, he
cannot then draw from those allegations an inferetitv Mini, he believed the •
statements to be true. Accordingly,
Cline had failed to plec*

, correctly concluded that

- sential element of a fraud claim.

Hie ilisi i«"" I court also correctly dismissed Cline's RICO claim because
Cline failed to plead a pattern of racketeering and hat! laded ie .specifically
plead the time, place and content of each

lal activity. On

appeal he argues, without MippuN.intj authority, that he was not required to
plead the speulir dates and places of the alleged misconduct under state civil
proreduro rules, even if he would have been required to do so under Inderal
rules. Cline fails to address the district court s
the RICO claim and therefore
Finah

iismissing

a challenge to those grounds.
correctly concluded that Cline violated Rule

) I i y assert nm claims against Forsythe that had been dismissed three [fines.
Cline failed to offer the district court a justification

lismissed

claim, and he similarly fails to do so on appea 1 Be r• a u se (• 1 i n < $ had no legal
-13-

justification for refiling the claims a fourth time, the district court correctly
concluded that the refiling was in violation of Rule 11. The court's sanctions
were reasonable because they consisted of filing restrictions to prevent future
frivolous filings related to this same core set of facts and included an award of
attorney fees only for the time spent by Forsythe's counsel responding to the
refilled claims.

Argument
1.

The district court properly dismissed Cline's fraud claim because
Cline never believed Forsythe's alleged misrepresentations, but
repeatedly sought to repudiate them.
In dismissing Cline's fraud claim, the district court did not decide an

issue previously decided by this Court. In the prior appeal, this Court
decided only that Cline's claim for fraud survived a defense based on absolute
or qualified immunity. Cline at ff 36-40. This Court did-not address
whether Cline had sufficiently pled the elements of fraud, nor had that issue
been raised until the present motion to dismiss was filed with the district
court. Accordingly, this Court's prior decision did not preclude the district
court from dismissing the fraud claim on this new basis. Moreover, because
Cline filed an amended complaint, Forsythe was entitled to raise any and all
appropriate defenses to that amended complaint.
-14-

Allegations s u p p o r t i n g a claim \ > I ' i • i H i' « i«i<•••. >' I»• •-1 ated w i t h
particularity. See U t a h i

Kuhre v, Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85,

f 22, (>H i\,{<l L!!:"!' I ••" nii-i'i I iiis particularity requirement, "a party must
a I leg*1 with f particularity facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."
The essential elements of fraud are:
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient knowledge upon which
to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
It; (8) and was thereby induced to act; fQ^ tn his injury and
damage.

Crookston v Far lut K\< h , l\ * ' P M 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
C

negations fail to show that he acted reasonably and in

ignorance of the falsity of anything Forsythe said. Cline never iidirvnl
Forsythe's statements regarding the childn»?»"s <\ iscl< >su r<\ I n • i sought to •
disprove them at ever
iJjul, ilii-y wi'iv

IM IMSIMI1

. the "children never told her
,md that the children were, in fact, "never bruised" by

R. 288-89. Cline stated that he had confirmed twice with two < i MO
children that they had not disclosed abuse u> Fi>rs\ 111, K 11. h In addition,
Cline confronted Forsythe about!«« i ii^nsiun l« substantiate the abuse when

he "got angry" at her and asked, "[H]ow can you substantiate that I bruised
[my son] when you haven't even spoken with him yet[?]" R. 17. Further, Cline
spoke to Forsythe's supervisor and asked for a different case worker to be
sent to re-investigate because "there was strong evidence to suggest that
[Forsythe] was lying about what the children told her." R. 18. Cline also
pursued an action in juvenile court to repudiate Forsythe's statements and
overturn the database substantiation. R. 288-89.
Unlike the authority cited by Cline, where the respective plaintiffs
believed the representations made to them, which then led to the inquiry of
whether it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to have so believed, here Cline
never believed Forsythe's representations. Thus, the authority cited by Cline
is inapplicable. The reasonableness of Cline's belief was simply not an issue
below because he never believed Forsythe's representations, but, in fact,
repeatedly challenged them. Any concessions Cline made in his custody battle
were not because he was misled by Forsythe. At most, his concessions were
made because Forsythe's statements, though untrue, would nevertheless have
an adverse impact on his efforts to obtain custody. Because it was apparent
from the face of the amended complaint that Cline never believed Forsythe's
representations to be true, the district court did not error in concluding that
Cline's fraud claim failed as a matter of law. See Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800
-16-

(stating that essential element of fraud is that defrauded party must act in
ignorance of representation's falsity).

2.

The district court correctly found Cline to be in violation of Rule 11
and imposed appropriate sanctions.
'"Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a

question of law." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163,171 (Utah 1989). "
a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated, and we
will affirm the particular sanction imposed by the trial court, including the
reasonableness of any fee award, absent an abuse of discretion." Id. Rule 11
affords a trial court "great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the
requirements of the particular case." Id.
Rule 11 provides that:
by presenting a pleading . . . an attorney or unrepresented party
is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances, (1) is not being presented for any improper
purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses,
and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 1Kb).

-17-

It is difficult to imagine a case more appropriate for imposition of Rule
11 sanctions than this one. Cline's amended complaint attempted to assert
the identical civil rights claims against Forsythe that had already been
dismissed three times, once in federal court on jurisdictional grounds and
twice with prejudice in state court. At the time Cline filed his amended
complaint, the first state court dismissal had been affirmed on appeal in its
entirety, except for the fraud claim. The factual basis of Cline's amended
complaint here was identical to the allegations in the three prior dismissals,
with significant portions of the allegations lifted verbatim from prior filings.
In response to the Rule 11 motion below, Cline was unable to present a
non-frivolous justification for bringing those claims a fourth time. And he
fails to present a non-frivolous justification here, asserting instead a rationale
arguably frivolous in its own right. Cline mistakenly asserts that since
Forsythe was allowed to re-litigate her fraud defense, he should not have
been sanctioned for misunderstanding that he could not also re-litigate the
previously dismissed claims. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. But, as explained above, the
new fraud defense was not previously litigated. Furthermore, Cline's
implication that he should have been given leniency because of his pro se
status is unavailing considering this court's recent pronouncement that
"Cline is a frequent litigant at the district court and appellate court levels and
-18-

is appropriately charged with knowledge of applicable procedures." Cline v.
State, 2007 UT App 111, f 5 (citing Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \ 4, 67
P.3d 1000). Given Cline's continued failure to submit a non-frivolous basis for
asserting his claims a fourth time, Forsythe moves this Court for an award of
fees on appeal.
Cline also fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in the sanction it imposed. In his opening brief, Cline does not challenge the
district court's imposition of filing restrictions and has accordingly waived
that issue on appeal. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540 (stating
that failure to raise issue in opening brief generally constitutes waiver).
Regarding the award of attorney fees, Cline fails to demonstrate that the
district court abused its "great leeway to tailor the [Rule 11] sanction to fit
the requirements of the particular case." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. The
affidavits of Forsythe's co-counsel unequivocally stated that the fees claimed
were only for the time spent defending the frivolous claims, not for defending
the remanded fraud claim. R. 464-65; 467-68. The district court ordered that
Forsythe was entitled to attorney fees "reasonably incurred in responding to
the unwarranted claims" and noted that the amount awarded was for
"attorney fees Forsythe reasonably incurred in responding to [Cline's]
unwarranted claims." R. 1180-81. Cline has failed to demonstrate that the
-19-

hourly fee or amount of time spent by Forsythe's counsel was unreasonable.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions.

3.

The district court properly dismissed Cline's RICO claim because the
claim should have been raised in previous litigation and because
Cline did not plead sufficient specific facts to establish the claim.

"Claim preclusion . . . operates as a complete bar to a second action
based on a claim that was (or could have been) raised in a prior action."
Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, f 9, 1 P.3d 558 (emphasis added). The
district court did not dismiss the RICO claim on claim preclusion grounds
because the dismissal of the prior action was before this court on appeal. But
any doubts the district court may have had regarding the finality of the prior
dismissal have now been resolved by this Court's dismissal of that appeal. See
Cline v. State, 2007 UT App 111 (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction).
The district court noted that, barring a reversal of the dismissal of Cline's
third complaint, the RICO claim would be barred by the doctrine of res
judicata because it was a claim that could have been raised in the previous
lawsuits. R. 490. The district court's conclusion that the claim could have
been raised previously is correct. All of the prior lawsuits contained federal
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causes of action. All of them centered factually around Cline's custody battle
and Forsythe's investigation into allegations of child abuse. Because Cline
could have brought this claim in any of the previous lawsuits, the dismissal of
the RICO claim should be affirmed on the basis of claim preclusion.
In any event, the district court correctly dismissed Cline's RICO claim
due to Cline's failure to failure to sufficiently assert a RICO claim. His RICO
claim consisted of this allegation:
State law makes it a crime to make up false allegations of child
abuse. On at least two occasions, various state employees caused
to be mailed by the United States [Postal] Service, fraudulent
allegations that Plaintiff had abused his children in an attempt to
defraud him from his home, his property, and basic liberty rights.
The persons who made these allegations knew that the
allegations were fraudulent. Because it has happened on at least
two occasions, it constitutes Mail Fraud as defined by 18 U.S.C.
[§] 1431.

R. 294. This vague allegation does not establish a "pattern" of racketeering
activity as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962, nor does it allege sufficient detail to
establish probable cause that racketeering or predicate crimes had been
committed as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1961. By challenging only one aspect of
the district court's analysis - the omission of specific dates and places - Cline
has waived any challenge to the other aspects of the district court's analysis.
See Aplt. Brf. at 18. Moreover, his argument regarding the omission of
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specific dates and places should be rejected because it is made without any
supporting authority. See Utah R. App. 24(a)(5), (9). Because the amended
complaint lacked the specificity required to show a RICO claim, the district
court properly dismissed the claim. See Glenn v. First Nafl Bank in Grand
Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371-72 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that spare and
conclusory allegations do not demonstrate a pattern); Condict v. Condict, 826
F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that plaintiff must sufficiently plead
threat of continuing activity).

Conclusion
The district court correctly dismissed Cline's fraud claim because Cline
failed to plead that he acted in reliance on Forsythe's statements and in
ignorance of their falsity. The district court also correctly dismissed Cline's
RICO claim because Cline failed to plead a pattern of racketeering and failed
to plead the time, place, and content of each alleged criminal activity. Finally,
the district court correctly concluded that Cline violated Utah R. Civ. P. 11
because the amended complaint asserted claims against Forsythe that had
previously been dismissed three times. The attorney fees imposed were
reasonable and reflected only the amount of time spent defending the
frivolous claims.
-22-

For these reasons, Forsythe respectfully asks this Court to affirm the
orders of the district court.
Dated this 25th day of July, 2007.

T CLIFFORD4>ETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee

Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee to the following this*

day of July, 2007:

Earl L. Cline
6015 South Fairwind Drive
West Jordan, UT 84084
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EARL L. CLINE, H,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING ALL
CLAIMS AGAINST FORSYTHE

V.

STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF CHILD
AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND OR
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES

Case No: 040911905

&

JUDITH ANN FORSYTHE aka CHRIS
FORSYTHE AS AN INDIVIDUAL,

Judge: Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on the 6th day of September, 2006, on
Chris Forsythe's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint before the Honorable
Sheila K. McCleve, District Court Judge. Defendant Forsythe was present and represented by

Steven A. Combe, Assistant Utah Attorney General. Plaintiff was present pro se. The Court,
having heard oral argument and considered the memoranda submitted, rules as follows:
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the following factual allegations to be true:
1.

This matter arises out of a DCFS investigation of alleged child abuse. First

Amended Complaint, fl| 8, 9.
2.

"On or about March 1, 2002, [a]n ex part[e] protective order was issued in Third

District Court, which contained an order that DCFS investigate the allegations that Plaintiff[']s
son Robert had been abused by Plaintiff." Id. at f 8.
3.

On or about March 4, 2002, Plaintiff contacted DCFS and reported that his

estranged wife had abused their children and informed DCFS of the existence of a protective
order requiring DFCS to investigate allegations of abuse by Plaintiff against his children. Id. at

19.
4.

DCFS employee Chris Forsythe was assigned to investigate the allegations of

abuse. Id.
5.

During her investigation, "Forsythfe] met with and interviewed all of the Cline

children as well as Plaintiff and Julie." Id. at ^[12.
6.

On March 20, 2002, Forsythe informed Plaintiff that "she had interviewed all of

the children and was not going to substantiate any allegations of abuse against Julie . . . she
claimed Alexis had told her that she witnessed the arm scratching incident against Robert, and
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. . . that Robert had told her that his mom had 'kicked him while going down the stairs, but he
was never hurt."' These statements were "untrue." Id.
7.

Forsythe told Plaintiff that "she would not substantiate against plaintiff because as

she reported, none of the children had reported any bruising during the alleged spanking and so it
wouldn't be considered abuse." Id. at ^[13.
8.
order.

On April 11, 2002, a hearing was held on the final dismissal of the protective

At that time, "Julie resurrected the previous issues that had been dismissed in court

including the fact that Robert had been spanked by a belt by Plaintiff, and an old allegation that
Robert had been involved in a [s]ex [ajbuse situation." Id. at f 18.
9.

The guardian ad litem subsequently made contact with Forsythe "to enquire about

the spanking incident that Chris had already investigated and dismissed." Id. at \\9. Forsythe
then "re-interviewed several of the [CJline children including Josh and Christopher. She then
decided to substantiate against Plaintiff for physical abuse of Christopher, Joshua and Robert
claiming that the children had told her that they had been bruised during spankings." Id.
10.

Sometime between the April 11, 2002 hearing and the substantiation in May

2002,1 "Michelle Bloomquist interviewed Alexis[,] Christopher and Joshua a second time to
determine if they had in fact been bruised by [Plaintiff]. While the interview was going on with

This was the same time period Forsythe allegedly re-interviewed the children.
Amended Complaint,ffl[15-16; Notice ofBeliefofClaim for Injury; pp. 3-4.
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Alexis, Chris and Josh called [Plaintiff] and told him that Michelle was asking if they had been
bruised by [Plaintiff] spanking them. They both indicated that Michelle was told that they had
not been bruised." Notice of Belief of Claim for Injury, pp. 3-4.2
11.

After learning that Forsythe had made the representation, Plaintiff again "spoke

with Christopher, Josh and Alexis to see if they had in fact told Chris Forsyth[e] the things she
alleged. Both boys denied telling Chris any of the things she alleged." Id.
12.

Plaintiffs son Robert "was never interviewed by Chris until [Plaintiff] got angry

and said 'how can you substantiate that I bruised Robert when you haven't even spoken with him
yet.' She agreed to speak with him after that." Id. at p. 4.
13-

During the investigation, Plaintiff spoke with Forsythe's supervisor and requested

that she "send someone other than Chris out to re-investigate the spanking as there was strong
evidence to suggest that Chris was lying about what the children told her." Id.
14.

"The children never told Forsyth[e] that they were bruised . . . [and] were never

bruised." Id.
15.

Forsythe "made up the allegations to help Julie keep custody of those three boys

which Plaintiff was trying to get from the court." First Amended Complaint, ^[19.

2

A copy of Plaintiffs "Notice of Belief of Claim for Injury" was attached to
Plaintiffs original complaint.
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16.

Plaintiff filed a petition against the substantiations and an administrative hearing

was held November 22, 2002. Id. at ^[20.
17.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition against substantiation in the Third District

Juvenile Court. Id. at 1(22.
18.

"On at least two occasions, various state employees caused to be mailed by the

United States Service, fraudulent allegations that Plaintiff had abused his children in an attempt
to defraud him for his home, his property, and basic liberty rights." Id. at ^[35
The Court takes judicial notice of the following material facts:3
1.

On June 10, 2004, Plaintiff filed his original complaint (hereinafter "Complaint

#1") in the current action against the State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services and
Forsythe.
2.

On October 5, 2004, following briefing and hearing, this Court entered an order

dismissing Complaint #1 with prejudice.
3.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.

4.

On December 28, 2004, while Plaintiffs appeal of Complaint #1 was pending,

Plaintiff filed a second complaint entitled "Civil Rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 &
1985" (hereinafter "Complaint #2") in the United States District Court for the District of Utah.

3

A court may take judicial notice of records and prior proceedings of a case
pending before it and before sister courts. See Utah R. Evid. 201; Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465,
468 (Utah 1989); Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977).
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5.

Complaint #2 included the same parties and most, if not all, the claims as

Complaint #1, along with additional parties and claims.
6.

On March 18, 2005, Complaint #2 was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction based on

the Rooker-Feldman4 doctrine and Younger* abstention doctrine.
7.

On March 30,2005, while Plaintiffs appeal of Complaint #1 was still pending,

Plaintiff filed a third complaint entitled "Civil Rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1985
and other pendant state claims" (hereinafter "Complaint #3") in the Third District Court.
8.

Complaint #3 included the same parties and most, if not all, the claims as

Complaint #1 and/or #2, along with additional parties and claims.
9.

Complaint #3 named Judge Robert K. Hilder as a party defendant and, as a result,

the case was transferred to the Fourth District Court.
10.

On November 17, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's

dismissal of Complaint #1 with the sole exception of Plaintiff s "claim against Forsythe in her
individual capacity for fraud arising only out of her second investigation." Cline v. State, 2005
UT App. 498, f*2, — P.3d —

4

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
5

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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11.

On January 6, 2006, the Fourth District Court, entered an order dismissing all

claims against Forsythe with prejudice, with the sole exception of Plaintiff s claim against
Forsythe in her individual capacity for alleged fraud arising only out of her second investigation,
which was dismissed without prejudice.
12.

On August 18, 2006, the order was certified as final.

On May 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed and served a motion to amend his complaint and

his First Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint #4").
13.

Complaint #4 includes most, if not all, the same claims against Forsythe that were

raised in Complaints #1 and/or #3, with the exception of one additional claim brought pursuant
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
Based upon the foregoing allegations and material facts, the Court makes the following
conclusions of law:
1.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend a

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. A motion
to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Rule 15(a) and, therefore, Plaintiff was
not required to obtain leave of Court before amending his complaint. See Wright v. Univ. of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 385 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

Complaint #4 represents Plaintiffs fourth attempt to raise identical or similar

claims against Forsythe arising out of the same core set of facts. All claims that were raised in
Complaint #1, and not reversed on appeal, are barred by the law of the case doctrine. See
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Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,1037 (Utah \995){(\noXmg Plumb v. State, 809
P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990)(law of the case is "a legal doctrine under which a decision made on
an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.").

In

addition, all claims that were raised or that could have been raised in Complaint #3, will
eventually be barred by the doctrine of res judicata unless the dismissal order is reversed. This
includes Plaintiffs new RICO claim. In any event, if Plaintiff disagrees with the dismissal
order, his recourse is to seek appellate review, not begin anew in this Court.
3.

In order to properly assert a RICO claim under § 1964(c), Plaintiff is required to

allege a violation of §1962, to allege a "pattern" of racketeering activity and to allege
"racketeering" or predicate crimes, in detail sufficient to establish probable cause. Here,
Plaintiffs vague allegation that "[o]n at least two occasions, various state employees caused to
be mailed by the United States Service, fraudulent allegations that Plaintiff had abused his
children in an attempt to defraud him for his home, his property, and basic liberty rights," First
Amended Complaint, ^[35, does not sufficiently assert a RICO claim.
4.

Complaint #4 fails to adequately plead a "claim against Forsythe in her individual

capacity for fraud arising only out of her second investigation." Cline v. State, 2005 UT App.
498,1)42, — P.3d —.

Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that "[i]n all

averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
with particularity." See also Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App. 85,1|22, 69 P.3d 286; Conder
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v. Hunt, 2000 UT App. 105, ^[15,1 P.3d 558. "Fraud is a false representation of an existing
material fact made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, and
there must be reasonable reliance thereon, resulting in the plaintiffs injury." Debry v. Noble,
889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). In order to allege a "valid claim for relief of
fraud, a party must allege with particularity facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."
Id. These essential elements are:
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
he [or she] had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991)(citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff

alleges that Forsythe committed fraud during her "second" child abuse investigation by falsely
representing that Plaintiffs children told her they had been bruised by Plaintiff during
spankings.6 First Amended Complaint, f 19. While Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to establish
the first four elements of fraud, he fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the final five

6

Plaintiffs alleges that Forsythe made an additional false representation on March
20, 2002, when "she refused to substantiate [abuse] against Julie . . . claiming] Alexis had told
her that she witnessed the arm scratching incident against Robert, and . . . that Robert had told
her that his mom had 'kicked at him while going down the stairs, but he was never hurt."
However, the alleged representation would have occurred during Forsythe's first investigation for
which she had absolute immunity. See Cline, 2005 UT 498,ffl[33-37.
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elements. In fact, it is clear from other allegations that he is incapable of establishing the final
five elements. First, Plaintiff alleges the false representation was made to "help Julie keep
custody of those three boys which Plaintiff was trying to get from the court," First Amended
Complaint, ^[19, not for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to act upon it. Second, Plaintiff does
not allege he was ignorant of the representation's falsity. Indeed, Plaintiff continually challenged
and denied the representation. See First Amended Complaint, Yh 11 -20; Notice of Belief of Claim
for Injury, pp. 2-7. He also twice confirmed with Christopher and Joshua that they had not
reported being bruised by Plaintiff. Id. at pp. 3-4. Plaintiff also knew that Forsyth had not
spoken to his son Robert because he "was never interviewed by Chris until [Plaintiff] got angry
and said 'how can you substantiate that I bruised Robert when you haven't even spoken with him
yet.' She agreed to speak with him after that." Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff also spoke with Forsyth's
supervisor and requested that she "send someone other than Chris out to re-investigate the
spanking as there was strong evidence to suggest that Chris was lying about what the children
told her." Id. Because the alleged false representation was not made for the purpose of inducing
Plaintiff to act upon it, and he did not believe the representation to be true, Plaintiffs fraud claim
against Forsythe fails as a matter of law. See Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937
P.2d 1274, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systamat, 892 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah
Ct.App. 1995).
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Based on the foregoing, the Court now enters the following ORDER:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Chris Forsythe's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is

hereby granted.
2.

All claims against Forsythe are dismissed with prejudice, with the exception of

Plaintiffs RICO claim which is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this / 0 day of September, 2006.
BY THE CO
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z-\

day of September, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Order Dismissing All Claims Against Forsythe, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Earl Cline
2220 East 4800 South, #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

^gmCDs,

Order Dismissing Alii Claims Against Forsythe With Prejudice
Cline v Forsythe, et al
Civil No 040911905

12

Cbh•4v\r^

ADDENDUM 2
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Forsythe's
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, entered October 11, 2006 (R. 474-82)

CCT-2 Prt 3 : 2 5

STEVEN A. COMBE - 5456
PEGGY E. STONE - 6658
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Forsythe
Physical Address:
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Thkd Judicial District

OCT 1 1 2006
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By-

4^

Deputy
rty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EARLL.CLINE,n,
Plaintiff,
I
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER GRANTING
FORSYTHE'S MOTION FOR
RULE 11 SANCTIONS

STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF CHILD
AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND OR
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
Case No: 040911905

&

JUDITH ANN FORSYTHE aka CHRIS
FORSYTHE AS AN INDIVIDUAL,

Judge: Sheila K. McCIeve

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on the 6th day of September, 2006, on
Chris Forsythe's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions before the Honorable Sheila K. McCIeve, District

Court Judge. Defendant Forsythe was present and represented by Steven A. Combe, Assistant
Utah Attorney General. Plaintiff was present pro se. The Court, having heard oral argument and
considered the memoranda submitted, now makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

On June 10, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint (hereinafter Complaint #1) in the

current action against Forsythe and the State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services,
relating to a DCFS investigation of alleged child abuse.1
2.

Complaint #1 raised the following claims against Forsythe: fraud,

misrepresentation, defamation (libel and slander), perjury, obstruction ofjustice, malicious
prosecution, "failure to prevent a civil conspiracy," "child abuse," and civil right claims under 42
U.S.C §§1981,1983, and 1985.
3.

On October 5, 2004, following briefing and hearing, this Court entered an order

dismissing Complaint #1 with prejudice.
4.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal.

5.

On December 28, 2004, while Plaintiffs appeal of Complaint #1 was pending,

Plaintiff filed a second complaint entitled "Civil Rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 &
1985M (hereinafter "Complaint #2") in the United States District Court for the District of Utah.

1

A court may take judicial notice of records and prior proceedings of a case
pending before it and before sister courts. See Utah R. Evid. 201; Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465
(Utah 1989); Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977).
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6.

Complaint #2 included the same parties and most, if not all, the same claims as

Complaint #1, along with additional parties and claims. The additional claims directed against
Forsythe included: alienation of affection, abuse of process, "deceit," negligence, "withholding or
manufacturing evidence," interference with a business relationship, "peonage," and "attempted
extortion."
7.

On March 18,2005, Complaint #2 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on

the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine and Younger" abstention doctrine.
8.

On March 30, 2005, while Plaintiffs appeal of Complaint #1 was still pending,

Plaintiff filed a third complaint entitled "Civil Rights Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1985
and other pendant state claims" (hereinafter "Complaint #3") in the Third District Court.
9.

Complaint #3 included the same parties and most, if not all, the same claims as

Complaint #1 and/or #2, along with additional parties and claims.
10.

Complaint #3 named Judge Robert K. Hilder as a party defendant and, as a result,

the case was transferred to the Fourth District Court.
11.

On November 17, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's

dismissal of Complaint #1, with the sole exception of Plaintiff s "claim against Forsythe in her

2

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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individual capacity for fraud arising only out of her second investigation." Cline v. State, 2005
UT App. 498, f42, — P.3d — .
12.

On January 6,2006, the Fourth District Court entered an order dismissing all

claims against Forsythe with prejudice, with the exception of Plaintiff s claim against Forsythe in
her individual capacity for alleged fraud arising only out of her second investigation, which was
dismissed without prejudice.

The Fourth District Court specifically found that Complaint #3

was "duplicative" of Complaint #1. Ruling Re: State Defendants' Motion to Quash Service and
Dismiss, p. 5. On August 18, 2006, the order was certified as final.
13.

On April 27, 2006, Forsythe filed a motion to dismiss the remaining fraud claim

in Complaint #1.
14.

On or about May 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed and served a motion to amend his

complaint and his First Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint #4" ).
15.

Complaint #4 includes most, if not all, the same claims against Forsythe that were

raised in Complaints #1 and/or #3, with the exception of one additional claim brought pursuant
to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
16.

On June 22, 2006, Chris Forsythe's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions was served

upon Plaintiff
17.

Plaintiff took no action in response to the motion and, as a result, the motion was

filed with the Court on July 17, 2006.
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18.

On September 6,2006, the Court dismissed all claims against Forsythe, including

the claims previously raised in Complaints #1 and/or #3, along with Plaintiffs RICO and fraud
claims.
19.

Plaintiff has been a party to numerous lawsuits and multiple appeals.4

20.

Forsythe incurred attorney fees in the amount of Seven Thousand and Eighty-

Three Dollars and Twenty Five Cents ($7,083.25), relating to her motion to dismiss
Complaint #4 and motion for Rule 11 sanctions, excluding any time spent addressing Plaintiffs
sole surviving "claim against Forsythe in her individual capacity for fraud arising only out of her
second investigation.'' Cline v. State, 2005 UT App. 498,1(42, — P.3d —.
21.

The attorney fees incurred were reasonable and necessary.

Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes the following
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
1.

Rule 11 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a pleading,
written motion or other paper to the court (whether by signing
filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
An inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose

4

See Camp v. Cline II, 2005 WL 1037638 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); Cline II v.
Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists, 2005 WL 67579 (Utah Ct. App. 2005);
Packer v. Cline II, 2004 WL 2021277 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
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such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;

2.

Complaint #4 represents Plaintiffs fourth attempt to raise identical or similar

claims against Forsythe arising out of the same core set of facts. These claims were previously
dismissed with prejudice by this Court and affirmed on appeal and/or dismissed with prejudice
by the Fourth District Court, with the exception of Plaintiff s "claim against Forsythe in her
individual capacity for fraud arising only out of her second investigation," Cline v. State, 2005
UT App. 498, T[42, — P.3d — , and RICO claim.
3.

The inclusion of previously dismissed claims in Complaint #4 violates Rule 11(b),

as such is not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law and has needlessly increased the cost of litigation.
4.

"As a general rule, a party who represents himself will be held to the same

standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar." Nelson v. Jacobsen,
669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983). Although pro se litigants are generally not sanctioned for a
"procedural misstep here and there," Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, T|4, 67 P.3d 1000, Plaintiff
is no stranger to the legal system. "When an individual avails [himself] of the judicial machinery
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as a matter of routine, special leniency on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate."
Id.
5.

Rule 11 "gives trial courts great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the

requirements of the particular case." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor\ 110 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 1989);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c). The sanction for violating of Rule 11(b) may consist of
"directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some
or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation." Id.
6.

Here, Plaintiff has needlessly increased Forsythe's cost of litigation by filing

claims that were not warranted by existing law or by the nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. Therefore, as a sanction, the Court believes it to be
reasonable and just that he be ordered to pay Forsythe's attorney fees reasonably incurred in
responding to the unwarranted claims.
7.

Furthermore, as an additional sanction, because Complaint #4 represents

Plaintiffs fourth attempt to raise identical or similar claims against Forsythe arising out of the
same core set of facts, the Court believes it to be reasonable and just that he be prohibited from
filing any new actions arising out of the same core set of facts without the advance express
permission of the Court.
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Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSION OF LAW, the
Court now enters the following ORDER:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Forsythe's motion for Rule 11 sanctions is granted.

2.

Judgment is entered against Plaintiff and in favor of Forsythe in the amount of

Seven Thousand and Eighty-Three Dollars and Twenty Five Cents ($7,083.25), for attorney fees
Forsythe reasonably incurred in responding to Plaintiffs unwarranted claims.
3.

Plaintiff shall not file any new actions arising out of the same core set of facts

without the advance express permission of the Court.
DATED this /£? day of S>fegSer, 2006.
BY
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^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of September, 2006,1 mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Order Granting Forsythe's
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, postage prepaid, to the following:
Earl Cline
2220 East 4800 South, #225
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

OojyVM^ /X^\IAVXYV-'
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ADDENDUM 3
UtahR. Civ. P. 11(b)

Rule 11

PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, & ORDERS
Notes of Decisions
In general 1
Exhibits 2

P.3d 895, 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 2002 UT 38.
Pleading <&=> 240
2.

Exhibits
While an exhibit may be considered as part of
the pleadings to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments and
the content of the exhibit is not to be taken as
part of the allegations of the pleading itself,
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 8(a), 10(c). Girard v.
Appleby, 1983, 660 P.2d 245. Pleading <s=> 310

1.

In general
A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by
raising novel claims or theories for recovery in
a memorandum in opposition to a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, because such
amendment fails to satisfy state pleading requirements. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 7, 8, 9, 10.
Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002, 48

R U L E 1 1 . SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PAPERS;
REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANCTIONS
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if
the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each
paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken
unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How

Initiated.
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